15 January 1945

15 January 1945

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15 January 1945

January 1945



Japanese offensive aimed at the Suichwan airfields opens

Great Britain

The first civilian ship since 1940 leaves London for France


Task Force 38 attacks Formosa and the Chinese coast

Inter-Imperialist Conflict of the Big Three

From Labor Action, Vol. IX No. 3, 15 January 1945, p.ك.
Transcribed & marked up by Einde O’ Callaghan for the Encyclopaedia of Trotskyism On-Line (ETOL).

“If there is one fundamental, underlying cause of the rift in Allied relations, it is in the basic differences of their national aspirations and outlook. It is strange that this flaw in the Grand Alliance was not obvious sooner to the peoples of the Allied nations. If it had been there would not have been so much stunned surprise in the Allied countries when it first began to show itself on the surface.”

In these words, Raymond Daniell, writing in the New York Times, explains the difficulties which the Big Three are now encountering in their attempts to “settle” among themselves the reorganization of the world. Actually, this rift, which is at last being recognized by everybody, comes as no surprise to revolutionary socialists. It was there from the very beginning for all who wished to see it. If the people did not see it sooner, the news analysts, who think it strange that it was not obvious sooner, played no small part in obscuring this fact, which even today Mr. Daniell treats as a “flaw” rather than as THE motive of the war itself.

Inter-Allied Competition

What is this “fly in the ointment” of Allied unity, which, if gently removed, would insure freedom, security and peace? What is this “basic difference in their national aspirations and outlook” mentioned by our Times reporter?

Each of the major belligerents entered the war in furtherance of its national imperialist interests, which conflicted with similar interests of the others.

Defeated in the 1914󈝾 war to end wars, capitalist Germany sought to regain its world position through the only way possible in the capitalist scheme of things, through force. In preparing for war, the German ruling class first crushed the German labor movement, and thus made the German workers and their organizations the first casualties of World War II.

Fascist Germany began its second great attempt at imperialist expansion in the territories nearest at hand, in Europe. In order to obtain a position of at least equality with its imperialist competitors, let alone world domination, Germany sought mastery of Europe.

British Aims

But a dominant position in Europe is necessary to satisfy the imperialist appetites of several other, powers. Holding together the Empire is the motive force of British policy. Success in this regard is directly dependent upon England’s strength on the European continent. Since she cannot dominate by direct occupation, England has always sought to operate in Europe through the formation of blocs and governments friendly to her interests.

As long as German fascism confined itself to crushing and exterminating the labor, movement, imperialist Britain raised no objections, but even looked on with admiration and approval. The attempt of German fascism to push England from its position in Europe led to war between the two.

If England was unwilling to yield her position to Germany, she is no more eager to yield .it to any other power, even to a “dear” ally. At present she aims at the organization of a bloc of western countries friendly to her, from the Scandinavian countries down through Belgium, Holland, France, Spain and Portugal. Hence her support of the reactionary Pierlot government in Belgium, the monarchy in Holland, fascist Franco in Spain, and de Gaulle in France. In eastern Europe she wants to retain her control of Greece in order to safeguard her position in the Mediterranean lifeline to Egypt and India. She seeks not merely anti-German governments but strongly pro-British ones.

Russian Imperialism

Russia seeks to enhance her interests or, more properly speaking, the interests of her ruling class, through control of at least the eastern half of Europe. At the expense of the liberties and democratic rights of the peoples of Europe, she demands half of Poland, control of the Balkan countries, in addition to the annexations already made of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia. For the Russian ruling class, this is but a stepping stone to the domination of Europe which every imperialist power seeks.

Churchill delivers Poland to Russia and gets Greece. Or so it seemed. Each of them yields reluctantly and tries to hold out for as much as possible. Churchill holds off recognition of the Lublin set-up, hoping to strike a better bargain: Stalin withholds approval of British action in Greece, hoping to lop off a piece of that country, Macedonia and placing it in his sphere of influence, perhaps in the Balkan Federation.

De Gaullist France is allowing herself to be wooed by both sides – England, which seeks to involve her in a western bloc, and Russia, which wishes to prevent this bloc from becoming too strong and threatening. France doesn’t wish to be a mere junior partner of the western bloc and therefore signs a treaty with Russia to strengthen her bargaining powers with England. The two big allies vie with each other for France’s support. In the end it will go to the stronger, the one which can offer more.

A German paratrooper from the 3rd Fallschirmjäger Division captured near Weywertz, Belgium, 15 january 1945.

More in 1945 than in 1940, though (at least, for Germans).

I don't think people forget it, its just those that declare it know their kids will never deal with it.

Aw, yeah. It's really sad that people demonize the average WWII German soldiers so much. Firstly, you only know what you've been told. If you had been raised being told over and over again that the sun revolved around the earth, of course youɽ believe it. And similarly, if you were indoctrinated by Nazi Propaganda, youɽ probably think you were fighting a just war. And even if you were against the war, if you refused the draft you endangered yourself and your entire family. Pictures like this help demonstrate that these were just normal kids.

I thought this guy was in his late 20s.

Photographer: [Unidentified] / US Signal Corps

Date taken: January 15, 1945

German POW’s captured in campaigns in Western Europe, were held in Allied POW camps. These came under the inspection of the Red Cross and all the evidence suggests that German POW’s held in Western Europe were well treated – accommodation was adequate as was food. The Red Cross took care of communicating with families. German POW’s captured on the Eastern Front had a far worse experience. Germans held as POW’s in British camps had access to Red Cross visits. There was a chance of escape but few attempted to do so especially when it became clear that Nazi Germany was not going to win the war. Many of the British POW camps were in remote areas of Britain. The escape routes that existed in occupiedWestern Europe and were manned by resistance fighters did not exist in Britain. Without these manned routes with their safe houses, any Germans who did escape were very much by themselves. Crossing into the Irish Republic was a possibility but this still required crossing water. Crossing the English Cannel was a serious problem for anyone wanting to get back to mainland Europe without being seen.

The most common cause of complaint to the Red Cross seems to have been about the cold in the huts they were housed in – i.e. the British weather. Another common complaint was about the quality of food served up. The latter complaint was presumably a common one from a British point of view in a German POW camp.

Once in captivity, a German POW was stripped of any Nazi regalia that they might have on them ranging from ceremonial daggers, badges and arm bands etc.

The number of German POW’s vastly increased as the Allies broke out of their Normandy landing bases in1944. As the Third Reich started to collapse in 1945, the numbers meant more and more POW camps were needed on mainland Europe. The Germans under the supervision of French troops were sent to work on farms or in mines. There was little reason for any German POW to escape and many simply got on with their lot. After the surrender of Nazi Germany, the priority was to get back to Germany itself men qualified in a trade that Germany needed to rebuild itself. As early as the summer of 1945, POW’s who were builders, farmers, drivers etc were sent back to Germany. However, those suspected of war crimes or being members of a political group were held back for further questioning.

“Our diet was inadequate during the first few months of captivity, and the prisoners lost up to a quarter of their body weight. There was sufficient water available and the hygiene arrangements were satisfactory. The conduct of the British camp supervisors and sentries was correct at all times.” Rudolf Böhmler.

However, medical treatment was an issue.

“A camp hospital was built, but there was a shortage of every kind of medicine. Dental treatment was practically out of the question because of a lack of the necessary instruments and equipment.” Rudolf Böhmler.

In Western Europe, the British and Americans did not have any intention of keeping German POW’s for longer than was necessary. They realised that many of the men they had captured had been conscripted into the war effort by the Nazis and that the vast majority had committed no war crimes. It was also generally believed that they would serve a better purpose rebuilding damaged Germany as opposed to simply languishing in a POW camp.

However, captured SS officers were kept away from regular army POW’s. At a POW camp at Bellaria, they were kept in a special guarded unit. Barbed wire kept both sets of prisoners apart. Whereas the army POW’s were allowed one hour’s exercise outside of the camp, the captured SS men were only allowed to exercise inside the camp and they were escorted by guards at all times.

In the autumn of 1946, senior army officers were transported to a POW camp at Munster. Here they could be visited by relatives who were allowed to bring with them food parcels.

Those suspected of being too politicised by Nazi doctrine, had to face a review board on a regular basis as the Allies were not prepared to release anyone who was suspected of having a Nazi past. A senior Allied officer was the head of any review board and he worked alongside two assessors. Anyone suspected of being politicised was not given a defence councillor but he did have access to an interpreter. The review boards had four categories. If a POW was placed in Categories 1 or 2, he would not be released. Categories 3 or 4 meant that a POW could expect a quick release from a POW camp as he was no longer a POW. However, many were simply moved from a POW camp to a former concentration camp at Neuengamme and held as a civilian detainee until the authorities were convinced that there were no issues concerning these individuals.

German POW’s continued to be held by the Allies for a number of years after the war had ended. The last POW’s held in Egypt returned to Germany in December 1948.

Mass Action

From Labor Action, Vol. IX No. 3, 15 January 1945, p.ق.
Transcribed & marked up by Einde O’ Callaghan for the Encyclopaedia of Trotskyism On-Line (ETOL).

Philip Murray Embraces the “Free” Russian Unions in Stalinist Paper

Philip Murray, of the CIO, has recently had published an article on international labor unity in the Russian publication War and the Working Class. It is a very queer article and only reveals again Murray’s stupidity and naivete. He is going to attend a conference, to be held in London this month, to discuss the formation of an international organization of labor. The conference will be composed of representatives of the British Trade Union Congress, the CIO and Russia. What we have to say about this conference revolves primarily around the question of Russia and the Russian representatives.

What will the Russians at the conference be representing? Surely not free trade unions. As a matter of record, there are no trade unions in Russia. There are organizations of workers in Russia, but there are also organizations composed of workers in Germany. There are no organizations of workers in Germany. There are no organizations of workers in Russia which are called in England or the United States trade unions. There are no organizations in Russia such as existed, for example, in the days immediately preceding the October Revolution. There is certainly nothing in Russia today in any way comparable to the free unions which existed after the October Revolution, in the days of the Bolshevik Party of Lenin, Trotsky and the other great leaders of the revolution.

What is known in Russia today as trade unions are groups of workers herded into Stalinized, totalitarian organizations, just as the German workers are herded into Hitlerized, totalitarian organizations. The Russian workers’ organizations are controlled and dominated by the GPU, just as the German workers’ organizations are controlled and dominated by the Gestapo. There is nothing in Russia in any way similar to the British Trade Union Congress or the AFL and CIO in the United States.

When Murray gets to London to this conference he will not sit down with democratically chosen representatives of the Russian workers but with Russian Stalinist politicians, who will be present, not in the interest of the Russian workers or of world labor, but solely in the interest of the Stalinist totalitarian bureaucracy. Murray, so to speak, will sit down with the GPU dressed in “overalls.”

Murray’s thinking about “free” unions in Russia takes its point of departure from his obsession with the war and the temporary and fortuitous block between England, Russia and the U.S. formed for the purpose of inflicting a military defeat on Germany. In Murray’s childlike mind he reasons that since England, Russia and the United States are united in war, therefore the labor movements of the three countries should be united.

Certainly the workers of England, Russia and the U.S. should be united. But there is no way at present to unite with the Russia workers. Today Murray can travel freely around the U.S. or England and talk to the workers and their free organizations, but neither he nor anyone else, except the GPU and the Stalinist bureaucrats, can travel around Russia and talk to the workers.

The German workers should be united with the rest of world labor. They aren’t and they can’t be, right now. But Murray is not concerned with any procedure to bring this to pass. He believes that the “German people” should be compelled to “make restitution for their crimes.” Does he demand that the Russian people make restitution for the crimes of Stalin and the totalitarian Stalinist bureaucracy? He does not, and we are happy that he does not. But why, then, does he not apply the same logic to the German workers?

Murray wants the “German people” to “make restitution for their crimes” while he prepares to go to London and sit at the table with Stalin’s GPU and the personal stooges who will represent Stalin at this conference.

This is Philip Murray’s conception of how to get an international organization of labor to carry on in the interests of the world working class after the close of the present war!

Soviet order of battle in Oder Vistula offensive 1945

Post by Kelvin » 13 Sep 2010, 13:29

Re: Soviet order of battle in Oder Vistula offensive 1945

Post by Kelvin » 18 Sep 2010, 18:24

Re: Soviet order of battle in Oder Vistula offensive 1945

Post by Art » 20 Sep 2010, 17:21

Re: Soviet order of battle in Oder Vistula offensive 1945

Post by Kelvin » 21 Sep 2010, 15:18

Re: Soviet order of battle in Oder Vistula offensive 1945

Post by Kelvin » 26 Sep 2010, 21:01

On Jan 1 1945 :
1st Byelorussian Front (Zhukov)
8th Guards Army : 4th Guards Rifle Corps (35, 47, 57 Guards Rifle Divisions), 28th GRC (28, 39 and 88 GRD),29th GRC (27, 74 and 82 GRD),6th Breakthrough Artillery Division (21st Light Artillery Brigade, 10th Gun Artillery Brigade, 18th Howitzer Brigade, 118th Heavy Howitzer Brigade, 119th Super Heavy Howitzer Brigade and 2nd Mortar Brigade) and 22nd Breakthrough Artillery Division( 13th Light Artillery Brigade, 59th Gun Artillery Brigade, 63rd Howitzer Brigade, 97th Heavy Howitzer Brigade, 32nd Mortar Brigade, 6th Heavy Mortar Brigade and 41st Guards Mortar Brigade), 43rd Guards Gun Artillery Brigade, 38th and 41st Antitank Brigades, 3rd Guards, 4th Guards, 13th Antiaircraft Divisions, 12th Guards Tank Corps, 878th and 1263th AA Regiments.

3rd Shock Army : 7 RC (146, 265 and 364 RD), 12GRC(23 Guards, 52 Guards and 33rd rifle division). 79 RC (150, 171 and 207 RD),136th Gun Artillery Brigade and 1622nd AA regiment.

5th Shock Army : 9 RC (230, 248,301 RD), 26 GRC (89 Gd, 94 Gd and 26th Rifle divisoin ), 32 RC (60 Gds, 295 and 416 RD), 44th Guards Gun Artillery Brigade and 1617 AA regiment.

33rd Army 16 RC (89, 339, 383 RD),38 RC (95 & 323 RD),62 RC (49, 222 and 362 RD), 142nd Gun Artillery Brigade and 1266th AA regiment.

47th Army : 77 RC (185, 234, 328 RD), 125 RC (60, 76, 175 RD), 129RC (132, 143, 260 RD),30th Guards Gun Artillery Brigade, 31st Antiaircraft Division, 1488th AA regiment.

61st Army : 9 GRC (12 GDs, 75 Gds, 415 RD), 80 RC (82, 212, 356 RD),89 RC (23, 311, 397 RD), 38th Guards Gun Artillery Brigade and 1282nd AA Regiment.

69th Army : 25 RC (77 Gds, 4, 64 RD),61 RC (41, 134, 247, 274 RD),91 RC (117, 312,370 RD), 115th Rifle Brigade, 11th Tank Corps, 5th Breakthrough Artillery Division (23rd Guards Light Artillery Brigade, 24th Gun Artillery Brigade, 9th Howitzer Brigade, 86th Heavy Howitzer Brigade, 100th Super Heavy Howitzer Brigade and 1st Mortar Brigade), 12 Breakthrough Artillery Division ( 46th Light Artillery Brigade, 41st Gun Artillery Brigade, 32nd Howitzer Brigade, 89th Heavy Howitzer Brigade, 104th Super Heavy Howitzer Brigade and 11th Mortar Brigade),62nd Gun Artillery Brigade, 12th SP gun Brigade (SU-76), 18th Antiaircraft Division ,11th Tank Corps and 68th Tank Brigade and 594th AA regiment.

1st Guards Tank Army (11th Guards Tank Corps and 8th Guards Mechanized Corps), 197th Light Artillery Brigade, 19th SP Gun Brigade (SU-76) and 64th Guards Tank Brigade.

2nd Guards Tank Army (9th Guards Tank Corps and 1st Mechanized Corps), 198th Light Artillery Brigade.

Front direct control : 2nd and 7th Guards Cavalry Corps, 9th Tank Corps, 119th Rifle Brigade,14th Breakthrough Artillery Division ( 169th Light Artillery Brigade, 172nd Howitzer Brigade, 176th Heavy Howitzer Brigade, 122nd Super Heavy Howitzer Brigade, 24th Mortar Brigade, 21st Heavy Mortar Brigade and 6th Guards Mortar Brigade) and 29th Breakthrough Artillery Divisions (182nd Light Artillery Brigade, 188th Howitzer Brigade, 189th Heavy Howitzer Brigade, 184th Super Heavy Howitzer Brigade, 46th Mortar Brigade, 26th Heavy Mortar Brigade and 36th Guards Mortar Brigade), 5th Guards Mortar Division (16th, 22nd, and 23rd Guards Mortar Brigades), 3rd Guards, 20th, 25th, 39th and 40th Antitank Brigades, 2nd Guards, 24th and 64th Antiaircraft Divisions, 11th Guards Tank Brigade (JS-II tanks).

Re: Soviet order of battle in Oder Vistula offensive 1945

Post by Art » 06 Oct 2010, 16:18

Re: Soviet order of battle in Oder Vistula offensive 1945

Post by donwhite » 06 Oct 2010, 23:36

Very Informative. May I impose upon you to ask if you are able to post similiar tables for the 2 Fronts Opposite East Prussia (2nd & 3rd Belorussian).

Re: Soviet order of battle in Oder Vistula offensive 1945

Post by Art » 08 Oct 2010, 08:42

Re: Soviet order of battle in Oder Vistula offensive 1945

Post by donwhite » 09 Oct 2010, 05:20

Many thanks & much appreciated.

Re: Soviet order of battle in Oder Vistula offensive 1945

Post by Kelvin » 07 Jul 2011, 19:18

In accordance with the link above, Soviet armored troop were well equipped in comparsion with her German counterpart :

From Soviet side ( Only Zhukov 's Front)

11th Guards Tank Corps : 220 x T-35-85, 21 x SU-122/152, 43 x SU-76/85 and 6 x SU-57

8th Guards Mechanized Corps : 193 x T-34-85, 21 x JS-2, 42 x SU-76/85 and 6 x SU-57

64th Guards Tank Brig : 68 x T-34-85

9th Guards Tank Corps : 201 x T-34-85, 10 x Sherman/Valentines, 21 x SU-122/152, 44 x SU-76/85 and 4 x SU-57

12th Guards Tank Corps : 203 x T-34-85, 21 x JS-2, 42 x SU-76/85 and 4 x SU-57

1st Mechanized Corps : 185 x Sherman/Valentines, 21 x sU-122/152 and 42 x SU-76/85

9th Tank Corps : 200 x T-34-85, 21 x JS-2 , 10 x Sherman/Valentines, 42 x SU-76/85 and 3 x SU-57

11th Tank Corps : 207 x T-34-85, 21 x JS-2, 44 x SU-76/85 and 3 x SU-57

German side ( Army Group A)

16. Panzer Division : Operational : 13 x Pz IV, 62 x Panther and 24 x StuG

17. Panzer Division : Operational : 65 x Pz IV, 19 x Jagdpanzer IV, 8 x Marder

10. PanzerGrenadier Division : operational : 26 x StuG

20. PanzerGrenadier Divison : operational : 46 x StuG

19. Panzer Division : operational : 43 x Pz IV, 31 x Panther, 21 x Jagdpanzer IV

25. Panzer Division : operational : 19 x Pz IV, 23 x Panther and 35 x Jagdpanzer IV L48 & L70

By division ( Soviet Corps), Soviet armored force had a decisive edge.

Re: Soviet order of battle in Oder Vistula offensive 1945

Post by Kelvin » 07 Jul 2011, 19:28

From the comparsion above, German had around 400 panzer or StuG in large formations while Russian ( only Zhukov units ) had nearly 2,000 tank or SP in large formation.

Of course, this figures is not complete as German had some StuG III deployed in separate StuG Brigade and also some separate sPz.abeilung with Tiger tanks.

Art, do you also have same figures on Konev's 1st Ukraiann Front in this moment ?

Re: Soviet order of battle in Oder Vistula offensive 1945

Post by Kelvin » 07 Jul 2011, 19:32

Re: Soviet order of battle in Oder Vistula offensive 1945

Post by Kelvin » 11 Jul 2011, 16:42

On January 1 1945
1st Ukrainian Front ( Konev)

3rd Guard Army : 21st Rifle Corps (58, 253 and 329 Rifle Division), 76th Rifle Corps (127, 287 and 359 Rifle Divisions), 120th Rifle Corps ( 106, 149 and 197th Rifle Divisions), 40th Guards Gun Artillery Brigade, 25th Tank Corps , 69th Antiaircraft Division, 150th Tank Brigade and 40 & 53 Engineer Brigades

5th Guards Army : 32rd Guards Rifle Corps (13, 95 and 97 Guards Rifle Division),33rd Guards Rifle Corps (9th Guards Airborne Division, 14 and 78 Guards Rifle division), 34th Guards Rifle Corps(15th and 58th Guards Rifle and 118th Rifle division), 3rd Breakthrough Artillery Division (15th Light Artillery Brigade, 5th Gun Artillery Brigade, 1st Howitzer Brigade, 116th Heavy Howitzer Brigade, 25th Super Heavy Artillery Brigade and 7th Mortar Brigade), 155th Gun Artillery Brigade, 29th Antiaircraft Division and 55 Engineer Brigade.

6th Army : 22nd Rifle Corps (218 and 273 Rifle Division), 74th Rifle Corps (181 and 309 Rifle Division), 359 Rifle Divison and 77th Rifle Brigade,159th Gun Artillery Brigade, 8th Guards and 26th Antitank Brigades and 62nd Engineer Brigade.

13th Army : 24th Rifle Corps (147 & 350 Rifle Division),27th Rifle Corps (6th Guards, 112 and 280 Rifle Divsion),102th Rifle Corps (117 and 121 Guards and 172 Rifle division) , 350 Rifle Division, 1st Breakthrough Artillery Divison (3 rd Guards Light Artillery Brigade, 1st Guards Gun Artillery Brigade, 2nd Guards Howitzer Brigade, 98th Heavy Howitzer Brigade and 16th Heavy Mortar Brigade),39th Guards Gun Artilery Brigade, 9th Guards Antitank Brigade, 10th Antiaircraft Division & 19th Engineer Brigade.

21st Army : 55th Rifle Corps (225, 229 and 285 Rifle Division),117th Rifle Corps (72, 120,125 Rifle Division),118th Rifle Corps ( 128, 282 and 291 Rifle Division), 34th Guards Gun Artillery Brigade and 52nd Engineer Brigade.

52nd Army : 48th Rifle Corps (111, 116, & 213 Rifle Division), 73rd Rifle Corps (50, 254 and 294 Rifle Division), 78th Rifle Corps (31, 214 and 372 Rifle Division),145th Gun Artillery Brigade, 21 Antiaircraft Division, 152nd Tank Brigade and 58th Engineer Brigade.

59th Army : 43rd Rifle Corps ( 80.,135 and 314 Rifle Division), 115th Rifle Corps ( 13, 92 & 286 Rifle Divisions), 245 Rifle Division, 127th Gun Artillery Brigade & 22nd Engineer Brigade.

60th Army : 15th Rifle Corps (9 th Cossack infantry division, 107 and 336 Rifle Division ), 28th Rifle Corps ( 246, 302 and 322 Rifle Division),106th Rifle Corps (100, 148 and 304 Rifle Division), 33rd Gun Artillery Brigade, 7th Guards Antitank Brigade, 23nd Antiaircraft Division and 59th Engineer Brigade.

3rd Guards Tank Army : 9th Mechanized Corps, 6th Guards Tank Corps, 7th Guards Tank Corps, 199th Light Artillery Brigade.

4th Tank Army : 6th Guards Mechanized Corps, 10th Guards Tank Corps and 93rd Tank Brigade., 200th Light Artillery Brigade and 68th Antiaircraft Division

Reserve : 1st Guards Cavalry Corps, 4th Guards Tank Corps, 31st Tank Corps, 7th Guards Mechanized Corps.
7th Breakthrough Artillery Corps :
13th Breakthrough Artillery Division (42nd Light Artillery Brigade, 47th Howitzer Brigade, 88th and 91st Heavy Howitzer, 101st Super Heavy Howitzer Brigade & 17th Mortar Brigade)
17th Breakthrough Artillery Division ( 37th Light Artillery Brigade, 39th Gun Artillery Brigade, 50th Howitzer Brigade, 92nd Heavy Howitzer Brigade, 108th Super Heavy Howitzer Brigade & 22nd Mortar Brigade)
10th Breakthrough Artillery Corps :
4th Breakthrough Artillery Division (168th Ligth Artillery Brigade, 171st Howitzer Brigade, 50th Heavy Howitzer Brigade, 163th Super Heavy Howitzer Brigade, 37th Mortar Brigade, 49th Heavy Mortar Brigade & 30th Guards Mortar Brigade ( Rocket Launcher).
31st Breakthrough Artillery Division (187th Light Artillery Brigade, 191st Howitzer Brigade, 194th Heavy Howitzer Brigade, 164th Super Heavy Howitzer Brigade, 35th Mortar Brigade, 51st Heavy Mortar Brigade and 38th Guards Mortar ( Rocker Launcher ) Brigade.
3rd Guards Mortar Division (15th, 18th and 32nd Guards Mortar ( Rocket Launcher) Brigades)
12th Mortar Brigade, 1st Guards Mortar Brigade, 10th Guards, 11th Guards and 37th Antitank Brigade, 37th Antiaircraft Division.

15 January 1945 - History

(August 1945)
Events > Postscript -- The Nuclear Age, 1945-Present

The atomic bombing of Japan in early August 1945 suddenly thrust the Manhattan Project into the center of the public eye. What formerly had been privy to a select few now became the object of intense public curiosity and scrutiny. Manhattan Project officials, however, had no intent to release what they viewed as essential military secrets. To both allay inordinate inquisitiveness and satisfy the legitimate public need to know, officials in early 1944 began a carefully designed public relations program in anticipation of when they would have to announce the news to the world. They perceived that, from the standpoint of security, the release of some selected information would make it easier to maintain the secrecy of the highly classified aspects of the project. The public relations program had two parts: preparation of a series of public releases and preparation of an administrative and scientific history of the project.

Responsibility for preparation of press releases fell upon General Leslie Groves and his Washington staff. Realizing the need for professional guidance, Groves approached William Laurence, the well-known science reporter for the New York Times. The Times agreed to release Laurence to the Manhattan Project for as long as he was needed. During the early months of 1945, Laurence visited the major atomic facilities and interviewed the leading participants. He also witnessed the Trinity test and the bombing of Japan. Laurence drafted most of the press releases on various project activities and events.

Release of the prepared statements was carefully controlled and managed following Hiroshima. Sixteen hours after the bombing, the White House released a statement by President Harry S. Truman, who was en route from the Potsdam Conference aboard the U.S.S. Augusta. "It is an atomic bomb," Truman announced, "harnessing . . . the basic power of the universe. The force from which the sun draws its power has been loosed against those who brought war to the Far East." Describing the race with the Germans for the bomb as the "battle of the laboratories," he noted that the contest "held fateful risks for us as well as the battles of the air, land and sea, and we have won the battle of the laboratories as we have won the other battles." Looking to the future and the possible mixed blessings of this atomic victory, the President observed that it had "never been the habit of the scientists of this country or the policy of this Government to withhold from the world scientific knowledge. . . . but under present circumstances it is not intended to divulge the technical processes of production or all the military applications, pending further examination of possible methods of protecting us and the rest of the world from the danger of sudden destruction." Recommendations would be made to Congress, Truman promised, on how the atom could become a "powerful and forceful influence towards the maintenance of world peace."

In the press releases that followed both before and after the bombing of Nagasaki, the public received selected background information on the Trinity test, atomic processes, production plants, communities, significant personalities, and the prospects of harnessing atomic energy. The well-orchestrated program of public releases revealed the drama of the atomic story in surprisingly detailed episodes. At the same time, the press release program managed to adhere to the central objective of preserving essential military security.

The second and largely complementary part of the Manhattan Project's public relations effort was the preparation and release of an administrative and scientific history of the project. In fall 1943, James Conant, Arthur Compton, and Henry D. Smyth, a Princeton physicist and a consultant to the Manhattan Project, discussed the possibility of preparing a public report summarizing the technical achievements of the wartime project. In Conant's view, a technical report would at once provide a basis for rational public discussion and make it easier to maintain the essential military secrets. When Vannevar Bush independently suggested a technical history in March 1944, Conant proposed assigning the task to Smyth. Groves agreed, and Smyth was provided with carefully drawn criteria to guide his efforts. Groves and various project scientists, including Robert Oppenheimer and Ernest Lawrence, reviewed the manuscript for accuracy and to ensure that nothing within it should be withheld.

On August 12, three days after the Nagasaki bombing, the War Department released the 182-page account, which became known as the Smyth Report. The report contained a wealth of information lucidly presented, but, as Groves clearly stated in his foreword, "no requests for additional information should be made." Persons either disclosing or securing additional information without authorization, Groves declared, would be "subject to severe penalties under the Espionage Act."

The immediate public response to news of the Manhattan Project and the atomic bombings of Japan, as filtered through the project's public relations efforts, was overwhelmingly favorable. When asked simply "do you approve of the use of the atomic bomb?", 85 percent of Americans in one August 1945 poll replied "yes." Few doubted that the atomic bomb had ended the war and saved American lives, and after almost four years of war, few retained much sympathy for Japan. The writer Paul Fussell, who as a 21-year-old second lieutenant was slated to be part of the invasion force going into Japan, perhaps has put it most succinctly:

When the bombs dropped and news began to circulate that [the invasion] would not, after all, take place, that we would not be obliged to run up the beaches near Tokyo assault-firing while being mortared and shelled, for all the fake manliness of our facades we cried with relief and joy. We were going to live. We were going to grow up to adulthood after all.

Over time, other reactions to the abrupt beginning of the atomic age began to emerge. Newspapers, magazines, and the airwaves around the United States became filled with a variety of opinions regarding the meaning of nuclear energy. These ran the spectrum from dark pessimism about the future of the human race to an unbounded utopian optimism. One of the most common reactions, especially among the intelligentsia, was to abolish war once and for all. The logic was simple: a future world war would inevitably involve nuclear weapons, and a war with nuclear weapons would mean the end of civilization -- therefore, there could never be another world war. A flood of peace and disarmament campaigns had followed the First World War, and a second world war had followed only two decades later. Thus, for some, the only solution appeared to be the creation of one government for the entire world. The movement to create the United Nations was already well underway, but doubtless some of its postwar support derived from this initial desire among many for world government.

In contrast to the fearful forebodings of the "one worlders" were the views of those for whom nuclear energy was a panacea, a new hope for humanity that in the very near future would create an "atomic utopia." Many magazines and newspapers in the late 1940s were filled with breathless stories of the benefits of virtually free and unlimited energy and predictions of everything from "atomic cars" to "atomic medicines." The belief that nuclear energy would ultimately prove more beneficial than harmful was strongest among those who had the most education.

A certain sense of remorse also slowly began to build among the public, especially as details became known of the destruction at Hiroshima and Nagasaki. An important early step in this process was when the entire August 21, 1946, issue of The New Yorker magazine was devoted to stories of the devastation of Hiroshima. (These articles were later reprinted as a book: John Hersey's Hiroshima.)


The Battle of Kapelsche Veer

Operation ELEPHANT was an attack by the First Canadian Army to clear a small island north of the Maas River in the Netherlands, known as Kapelsche Veer. This is where German Paratroopers had set up a strong defensive position. The Canadian regiments dealt with difficult conditions and suffered high casualities, but on the morning of 31 January 1945, the German paratroopers evacuated the island.

A few days before Operation "ELEPHANT" began, men from the special attack force trained launching and paddling their canoes down the icy river. (Photo: LAC - 3201636)

After failed Polish and British attacks, First Canadian Army received the order to clear a small island north of the Maas River in the Netherlands where the 10th and 17th German Paratroop Regiment had established a small bridgehead.

Although the bridgehead posed no immediate threat, General John Crocker, Commander, 1st British Corps, was fearful that a major enemy assault across the Maas could still be attempted and wanted the German position eliminated.

Known as Kapelsche Veer, the flat low-lying island offered no cover aside from deep dykes and was notoriously cold, windy and water-logged in the winter. Roughly 150 German paratroopers held a strong defensive position between two brick houses, codenamed “Grapes” and “Raspberry.”

As part of Operation ELEPHANT, The Lincoln and Welland Regiment with the support of The Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders of Canadaand the South Alberta Regiment, were to clear the island by 31 January 1945. The plan called for the attack to commence at 7:30 AM on 26 January, “A” and “C” Companies of the Lincoln and Wellands attacking the eastern end of the island, with “B” Company crossing onto the centre of the island, and “D” Company being kept in reserve to be sent in as reinforcements where needed—the goal being a pincer movement on the enemy’s position.

Meanwhile, 60 volunteers were to set out in four-man canoes at the island’s eastern tip and paddle westward towards the harbour, ultimately digging in where they could prevent German reinforcements from crossing over by ferry onto the island. Because the canoe “commando” would come into range of German troops on both banks of the river and the three rifle companies would be exposed on top of the dykes, a thick smoke screen was to be used to help provide cover.

A map of the battle of Kapelsche Veer. Inset: the river Maas and the surrounding area. (Image: C. P. Stacey’s The Victory Campaign, vol. III)

Unfortunately, nothing went as planned. “C” company’s Wasps (tracked flamethrowers) were unable to climb up the sides of the dykes and got stuck in the mud. Meanwhile, “A” Company managed to push forward along the dyke line and got close to its objective, but the combination of the smoke screen and enemy fire forced it to pull back. Soldiers in the canoes were hindered by thick ice covering the river and many had to wade into the fast moving water in order to untangle their boats causing their snow suits to become sodden and heavy.

Men from the Lincoln and Welland Regiment the day after the end of the battle of Kapelsche Veer. (Photo: LAC - 3337836)

As “A” Company waited for “C” company to arrive, the Germans started counterattacking and heavy mortar and machine gun fire caused casualties to mount alarmingly as the men desperately tried to dig into the frozen ground for cover. Over on the western side of the island, “B” Company moved northward towards its objective without incident until the smoke screen dissipated and the enemy, now only 50 yards away to the east, opened fire.

The canoes came under intense fire as they moved forward, soon forcing the soldiers—their rifles frozen and useless—to land on the bank near “A” Company. After intense fighting and severe casualties, “A” and “C” Companies were forced back and “B” Company held on, awaiting reinforcements from “D” Company. Attempts to provide armoured support to the west also suffered from difficulties in ferrying the South Alberta Regiment’s tanks across the river.

Over the next five days the Argylls, with the support of the South Albertas and what was left of the Lincoln and Wellands continued to hold their position on the island. Although they tried to advance closer towards the two houses, an extensive series of enemy underground tunnels and a seemingly endless supply of ammunition made gaining any ground difficult and costly.

The enemy’s counter attacks were fierce but they were also suffering from high casualties and frostbite. Every man on the island was busy digging in to stay warm but stress and exhaustion took their toll. Multiple attempts were made by the Canadians to attack the harbour, with the support of a few tanks ferried across the river.

Poor weather conditions like rain, sleet and snow as well as the shelling made the ground turn to mud, leaving a lot of tanks bogged down and useless. By the night of the 29/30 January, sheer exhaustion was making it difficult for the Canadians to hold their ground, but a few final attacks on the objectives were made.

On 30 January, the Germans tried twice more to bring reinforcements onto the island but their ferries were sunk in the river. On the morning of 31 January a massive German artillery barrage covered the evacuation of the remaining German paratroopers from the island.

Operation ELEPHANT had a staggering effect on the Lincoln and Welland Regiment which suffered more than 183 casualties (including 50 dead) in only six days of fighting. Using a combination of historical research and forensic anthropological analysis, the Directorate of History and Heritage of the Department of National Defence has identified the following soldier whose remains were recovered due to modern human activity.

Re: East Prussia january 1945

Post by FORBIN Yves » 13 Jun 2018, 14:43

Re: East Prussia january 1945

Post by Art » 13 Jun 2018, 17:30

Re: East Prussia january 1945

Post by Kelvin » 14 Jun 2018, 10:24

FORBIN Yves wrote: 4 Army :
1 HG Pz Div : 42 Pz V + 35 Pz IV + 4 Stug : total 81
2 HG PzG Div : 32 Stug

With Corps :
259 Stug Bde : 43 Stug

2 Army :
7 Pz Div : 32 Pz V + 28 Pz IV : total 60
505 Heavy Panzer Bn : 52 Tiger I

With Corps :
209 Stug Bde : 29 Stug
909 Stug Bde : 30 Stug
185 Stug Bde : 28 Stug
249 Stug Bde : 28 Stug
279 Stug Bde : 18 Stug
190 Stug Bde : 29 Stug
904 Stug Bde : 31 Stug
909 Stug Bde : 30 Stug

7.Panzer division is much more powerful than you data above, She received 10 x Jagdpanzer IV L70(A) and 21 x Jagdpanzer IV L70(V) after Jan 1 1945, on the eve of Soviet offensive, she had 31 x Jagdpanzer IV L70, 13 x Marder II, 37 x Panther tanks and 28 x Pz IV tanks, 2 x Mobelwagen AA tanks.

And HG Korpstruppen : Pz.Jg.Abt. HG with 18 x Jagdpanzer IV L48 were attached to Fallschirm-PanzerGrenadier Division HG 2.

And I think it is sPz.Abt. 507 had 52 x Tiger I.

Re: East Prussia january 1945

Post by GregSingh » 14 Jun 2018, 11:27

Both units were in East Prussia.

505 Heavy Panzer Bn
1 January 1945: 34 Tigers operational. Attachment to the XXXI.Armee-Korps.
12 January 1945: Assembly area in the Angerapp area

507 Heavy Panzer Bn
1 January 1945: 51 Tigers reported operational.
14 January 1945: Start of the main offensive of the 2nd Byelorussian Front. The battalion was alerted and moved to the area of Karniewo (the 1./ and 2./schwere PanzerAbteilung 507 moved in the direction of Czarnostów the 3./schwere Panzer-Abteilung 507 went to Szlasy-Złotki).

Re: East Prussia january 1945

Post by FORBIN Yves » 15 Jun 2018, 23:43

7.Panzer division is much more powerful than you data above, She received 10 x Jagdpanzer IV L70(A) and 21 x Jagdpanzer IV L70(V) after Jan 1 1945, on the eve of Soviet offensive, she had 31 x Jagdpanzer IV L70, 13 x Marder II, 37 x Panther tanks and 28 x Pz IV tanks, 2 x Mobelwagen AA tanks.

And HG Korpstruppen : Pz.Jg.Abt. HG with 18 x Jagdpanzer IV L48 were attached to Fallschirm-PanzerGrenadier Division HG 2.

And I think it is sPz.Abt. 507 had 52 x Tiger I.

Re: East Prussia january 1945

Post by Kelvin » 16 Jun 2018, 07:45

Re: East Prussia january 1945

Post by Art » 16 Jun 2018, 18:54

Armor status of AOK 2 as of 31.12.1944:
Operational: 50 Tigers, 33 Panthers, 28 Pz-III/IV, 229 StuGs/StuHs, 18 misc. Total 358 operational tanks/assault guns plus 35 in repair. Weakening of the army throughout the month of December (I presume as a result of transfers of units to Hungary) is more than obvious.

Re: East Prussia january 1945

Post by donwhite » 17 Jun 2018, 10:33

Art, great post and Links. Very informative.

Re: East Prussia january 1945

Post by Art » 18 Jun 2018, 19:52

Re: East Prussia january 1945

Post by Art » 18 Jun 2018, 20:28

Number of weapons in AOK 2 (ten infantry and one tank division plus separate units) as of 31.12.1944: . oepripasov

German rifles - 107 680
Rifles, 7-62mm (Soviet) - 720
German machine guns - 6952
Machine guns, 7.62mm (Soviet) - 215
Rifle grenade launchers - 3791
Pistols, 7.63mm (Soviet) - 73
Machine-pistols, 7.63-mm (Soviet) - 139
Pistols, 7.65mm - 6930
Pistols, 8mm - 17 633
Machine-pistols, 8mm - 7063
M22 pistols (Czech) - 137
MP44 assault rifles - 4142
7.5-mm machine guns (french) - 62
50-mm mortars (German) - 12
50-mm mortars (Soviet) - 5
81-mm mortars - 576
120-mm mortars - 258
75-mm light infantry guns - 218
76.2-mm infantry guns (Soviet) - 48
150-mm heavy infantry guns - 74
37-mm AT guns - 14
45-mm AT guns (Soviet) - 36
57-mm AT gun (US) - 1
50-mm AT guns - 5
75-mm AT guns (Pak 40) - 199
75-mm AT guns (Pak 97/38) - 8
76-mm AT guns (Soviet) - 5
Panzerfausts - 34 433
Panzerschrecks - 1679
50-mm tank guns (L42) - 1
50-mm tank guns (L60) - 9
75-mm tank guns (L24) - 29
75-mm tank guns (L43 and L48) - 29+195
75-mm tank guns (L70) - 39
88-mm tank guns - 55
105-mm assault howitzers - 46
20-mm Flaks - 130
20-mm quad Flaks - 13
20-mm tank guns - 18
37-mm Flaks - 33
88-mm Flaks - 12
75-mm mountain guns (Geb 36) - 25
105-mm howitzers mod.16 - 12
105-mm howitzers mod. 18 - 393
105-mm guns - 31
150-mm howitzers - 125
155-mm howitzers (French or Polish) - 4
210-mm howitzers (Mrs 18) - 5
150-mm rocket launchers - 80
210-mm rocket launchers - 18
300-mm rocket launchers - 36
280/320 rocket launchers - 30
73-mm rocket launchers - 21

Re: East Prussia january 1945

Post by FORBIN Yves » 20 Jun 2018, 13:17

Art wrote: Detailed situation map AOK 2 early January 1945:

Armor status of AOK 2 as of 31.12.1944:
Operational: 50 Tigers, 33 Panthers, 28 Pz-III/IV, 229 StuGs/StuHs, 18 misc. Total 358 operational tanks/assault guns plus 35 in repair. Weakening of the army throughout the month of December (I presume as a result of transfers of units to Hungary) is more than obvious.

Appear Stug Brigades on Russian maps ofc infos can be less accurate than on a German map … by ex this 209 Stug Bde i have with 14 ID / XX AK and there between 129 and 299 ID/ XXIII AK, just a detail.

In AG Mitte and 2A Reserves : 3rd and 6 Pz Div transfered in Hungary ( arrive 8 and 20/12/44 to front ) BTW the 3rd was excellent with 168 tanks/assault guns/Jpz .

And with 9 Army AG Mitte/A Reserves change the 26/12. the 25/12 IV PZK SS to Modlin area also transfered in Hungary with 180 in 3 and 5th Pz SS reinforced by 2 Inf Bns of the 11 PZG SS. . 9Armee.htm

Re: East Prussia january 1945

Post by FORBIN Yves » 20 Jun 2018, 14:25

FORBIN Yves wrote: 4 Army :
7.Panzer division is much more powerful than you data above, She received 10 x Jagdpanzer IV L70(A) and 21 x Jagdpanzer IV L70(V) after Jan 1 1945, on the eve of Soviet offensive, she had 31 x Jagdpanzer IV L70, 13 x Marder II, 37 x Panther tanks and 28 x Pz IV tanks, 2 x Mobelwagen AA tanks.

And HG Korpstruppen : Pz.Jg.Abt. HG with 18 x Jagdpanzer IV L48 were attached to Fallschirm-PanzerGrenadier Division HG 2.

And I think it is sPz.Abt. 507 had 52 x Tiger I.

I have mentionned number in the Div the 01/01 and these Jpz arrive just after.

Jpz Bn 42 in Fire brigades and the stuff is excelent . have the 8 january 21 Pz IV/70 in fact Jagdpanzer to Mielau surely with 7.Panzer Division the 13 when Russian attack.
In more 10 join the Div the 03/01 i think with Pz Rgt which have also received 17 Pz IV in december.

But in this amazing book i see often Mielau/Mlawa a center as Paderborn by examble where Armored units receive vehicles entrained there also maybe especialy Jagdpanzer ?

7 Pz
31 Pz IV/70
32 Panther ( 01/01 in the chart for each month )
28 Pz IV ( " " )

5 Pz
47 Panther
33 Pz IV
6 Stug
32 Jpz IV/Pz IV/70

But after never receive tanks/assault guns/Jpz replacements then 7th Pz used near Elbing providing a strong resistance get 17 Pz IV/70 and 17 Stug in 02/45 and 10 Pz IV/70 in 03/45.

At this time Germans produced a lot of armored vehicle without turets more easy to build and Panzer Divisions received it to replace tanks less numerous and the % of Stug/Jpz increasing in Pz Rgts up to april 45.

Re: East Prussia january 1945

Post by donwhite » 21 Jun 2018, 03:36

Courtesy of Art for reminding me of the existence the 'German Docs in Russia' website (an absolute treasure trove and I should check it out more often!) . Detailed Order of Battle for 4th Armee as at 4th January 1945- I've previously only seen this level of detail in a 'Heerestruppen der Unbersicht Armee Gruppe Mitte' document, but only up to the 7th December 1944.

Re: East Prussia january 1945

Post by FORBIN Yves » 21 Jun 2018, 12:41

donwhite wrote: Courtesy of Art for reminding me of the existence the 'German Docs in Russia' website (an absolute treasure trove and I should check it out more often!) . Detailed Order of Battle for 4th Armee as at 4th January 1945- I've previously only seen this level of detail in a 'Heerestruppen der Unbersicht Armee Gruppe Mitte' document, but only up to the 7th December 1944.

Also in German archives MOD maybe or other ? possible to find these Gliederung ?

Also i would like upload the nice last maps posted with links but i can' t save in one full piece if one can say me how i can ?

Re: East Prussia january 1945

Post by Art » 23 Jun 2018, 09:36

From the article discussed here previously: strength of German Army Groups on the Eastern Front by the end of 1944 (the post says that the table stands for early 1944 but that's a mistake):

HG Sud and A should be switched over actually. I guess about 43 000 SS soldiers in the Army Group Center mostly belonged to the 4 SS Panzerkorps which was transferred to Hungary in the last days of 1944.
For comparison, according to Ziemke the strength of the Army Group Center on 1 October 44 was about 700 000 soldiers (not quite clear what was included here exactly). It seems natural that it increased somewhat after 3 months of relative lull.
Curiously enough, Soviet official sources (e.g. 12-volume history of WW2) estimated the strength of Army Group Center in Prussia in January 1945 as 580 000 regular soldiers and 200 000 men in Volkssturm. A rare case when they underestimated German strength instead of inflating it.

Flood of 1945

Although the Great Flood of 1937 gets most of the attention, and perhaps deservedly so, the flood that beset the Ohio River Valley eight years later was also extremely damaging. While 1937 is the flood of record at Louisville, 1945 is in second place (albeit a distant 2nd), with a peak stage at Louisville of 74.4 feet. This stage is about eleven feet below the 1937 stage, and ties with the stage set during the devastating 1884 flood.

1937 Stage Rank 1945 Stage Rank 1884 Stage Rank
Clifty Creek 475.9 1 464.0 3 464.3 2
McAlpine Upper 52.15 1 42.1 2 41.7 3
McAlpine Lower 85.44 1 74.4 2 (tie) 74.4 2 (tie)*
Cannelton 60.8 1 54.4 2 N/A** N/A**
Tell City 56.95 1 52.0 3 50.8 4***

* McAlpine Lower's 3rd highest stage is 73.46' set in 1964
** Cannelton's 3rd highest stage is 53.9' set in 1964
*** Tell City's 2nd highest stage is 53.0' set in 1964

As is almost always the case with massive Ohio River floods, snow melt had very little impact. The deepest snow cover at Louisville between New Year's Day and the flood was only 3 inches on the 29th of January, and that melted away in a few days. The bulk of the heavy rain that caused the flood fell during a three week period leading up to the flood. Rainfall during that time was over 500% of normal in southern Indiana, and around 400% of normal along the length of the Ohio River (see graphics below -- click on them for a larger image).

Kentucky/southern Indiana precipitation departure from normal.
U.S. precipitation departure from normal.

The rain came in four main waves, on February 20-21, February 25-26, March 1-2, and March 5-6. February 26 still stands as Louisville's 5th wettest February day on record (2.85"), and March 6 is the 10th wettest March day on record (2.66"). March 1945 is the 3rd wettest March on record, and February 1945 is actually only #19 on the list. However, instead of looking at calendar months, the period February 20 - March 8, 1945 is the second wettest such period on record at Louisville (1997 is #1).

The following photos were taken in the Butchertown neighborhood in the vicinity of today's I-64/71 split.

Re: The 424th Tiger Tank Battalion in the Battle of Lisow in Poland in January 1945.

Post by Art » 05 Nov 2020, 11:05

Re: The 424th Tiger Tank Battalion in the Battle of Lisow in Poland in January 1945.

Post by marthus » 05 Nov 2020, 20:45

Okay .
Art, I do not understand Russian, if 'it is possible, could you give a summary of the days of January 12 and 13 on the actions described in this story and which concern the 17th Armored Division as well as the 424th Battalion

Re: The 424th Tiger Tank Battalion in the Battle of Lisow in Poland in January 1945.

Post by I have questions » 06 Nov 2020, 03:47

"The Soviet Vistula–Oder Offensive started on 12 January 1945. The battalion had been deployed far forward, possibly by the direct intervention of Hitler, contrary to the wishes of all command levels from the battalion commander all to the General of Army Group A. The battalion initially received no orders. On 13 January, it was ordered towards Lisow. En route, one Tiger II fell through a bridge. All three companies attempted to attack, but many bogged down in poor ground and were not recoverable. Leutnant Oberbracht lost both tracks but destroyed 20 enemy tanks 50 to 60 enemy tanks were destroyed in total. Several other tanks broke down while moving to contact. IS-2s and anti-tank guns in Lisow ambushed the battalion, which was almost destroyed even the battalion commander's tank was knocked out. One Tiger II broke down while successfully recovering a bogged down comrade, and had to be destroyed. Poor reconnaissance was blamed for the debacle"

I already posted this before. This applies to the 424th.

Re: The 424th Tiger Tank Battalion in the Battle of Lisow in Poland in January 1945.

Post by marthus » 06 Nov 2020, 09:24

but we know all these accounts taken from books written by German, English or Polish historians . (see what I wrote above in my first post!)
but these rendered counts are all very vague and especially probably exaggerated as regards the losses occasioned to the Soviets on January 13, 1945 and also the losses of this 424th battalion lissow then as I already indicated above in this post, one speaks of the competitive annihilation of a battalion (at that time, at least 45 Tiger tanks), while according to the book recently released by Igor Nebolsin, in Lissow the fighters of the 61st armored brigade of the Soviet Guard, revealed the carcasses of only 12 Tiger tanks .
and the second question was whether as most accounts indicate, the 424th Battalion had been confronted with Russian heavy tanks of the Js-2 type at Lissow, which ultimately does not appear to be the case . !
and I was counting on Art, who always has excellent information concerning the German-Soviet conflict to perhaps provide us with some answers . which he has partly done .

Re: The 424th Tiger Tank Battalion in the Battle of Lisow in Poland in January 1945.

Post by hexametilen » 06 Nov 2020, 14:34

Typewriter images of 1945 papers go hard on my eyes. but well. I will try to answer.

This document of Colonel Albert Brux, commander of 17th Tank Division,
states that:

1) 501th (sic, not 424, but 501) separate tank batallion was attached to 24th Tank Corps before the battle started.

2) 13.1.45 (again mentioned as 501th) was attached to 17th Tank Division, and it was arriving from NW (assuming Brux's HQ was west of Хмельник, this is right. Lisow (Лисув) is 8 km to NW from Хмельник).

3) The batallion was cut off (from main force of 17th Tank Division, I presume) by Russian tank attack, so Brux "moved towards it to debrief its commander about situation and deploy the batallion in right place for attack".

And. that is all. not even mentioned, did he get into contact with batallion.

15.1.45 around 16:00 Brux mobile command group was cut off by advancing Red Army tanks, radio was destroyed. He lost control over his troops and was captured 17.1.45

Watch the video: 12 January 1945 (July 2022).


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